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Abstract 
 
There are two aspects to Wittgenstein’s method of deconstructing pseudo-philosophical problems that need 
to be distinguished: (1) describing actual linguistic practice, and (2) constructing hypothetical ‘language-
games’. Both methods were, for Wittgenstein, indispensable means of clarifying the ‘grammar’ of 
expressions of our language – i.e., the appropriate contexts for using those expressions – and thereby 
dissolving pseudo-philosophical problems. Though (2) is often conflated with (1), it is important to 
recognize that it differs from it in imprtant respects. (1) can be seen as functioning as a direct method of 
‘proof’ (i.e., attempt to convince the reader of some thesis), and (2) as an indirect method of ‘proof’ – proof 
by reduction ad absurdum.  This essay will be devoted to clarifying (2) by forging an analogy with 
surrealism in art.   
 
 
 
The notion of a ‘language game’ plays a pivotal role in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Like 
the notion of a ‘conceptual framework’, ‘discourse’, or ‘practice’, it is a loose concept, 
having ‘no precise definition or decisive and non-arbitrary criterion of individuation’.1 
Wittgenstein uses it to refer not only to actual uses of language – which might involve 
very basic ‘moves’, as in teaching language to children, or more sophisticated/complex 
‘moves’, as we find in everyday discourse – but also to hypothetical or invented uses of 
language, which may again be basic or complex.   
 
I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call 
language-games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we 
use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. Language-games are 
the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study 
of language-games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive 
languages....When we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist 
which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see 
activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and transparent. [BB p. 17] 
 
_____________________________ 
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Hypothetical language-games involve imaginary uses of language that are meant to be 
compared to actual language-games. They involve constructing ‘objects of comparison 
which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way of similarities and 
dissimilarities’. [PI §130] A hypothetical language-game is a method of instruction, and 
an indispensable one at that.   
 
Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts we have 
than constructing fictitious ones. [CV p. 74]  
 
Constructing ‘fictitious concepts’ involves assigning new roles to them, rearranging the 
phenomena of language, so to speak, and exploiting the dissimilarity between their roles 
in the invented use-contexts and their roles in their actual use-contexts to bring out a new 
angle on them, or see them in a clearer light. This is a subtler way of deconstructing 
pseudo-problems than the method of describing actual uses of language because it 
operates in an indirect manner. Hypothetical language games involve abstracting 
concepts from their normal circumstances of application.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in such imagined uses of 
language’, Wittgenstein remarks, ‘for here we can command a clear view of the aim and 
functioning of words’. [PI §5] Rearranging facts and assimilating pictures ‘[alter our 
way] of looking at things’ [PI §144]; they help put things into view.  
 
One of the most important methods I use is to imagine a historical development 
for our ideas different from what actually occurred. If we do this we see the 
problem from a completely new angle. [CV p. 37] 
 
But how does it ‘disperse the fog’ to take such departures from reality? How do 
language-games help us see things from a ‘completely new angle’?   
 
In answering this, I find it useful to draw an analogy with surrealism in art. Surrealism 
originated in Paris in the late 1910s / early 20s as a literary and artistic movement that 
aimed to revolutionize human experience in its personal, cultural, social, and political 
aspects. It grew principally out of the earlier Dada movement, which, prior to World War 
I, produced works of ‘anti-art’ that deliberately defied reason and tradition. Early 
exponents of the movement were influenced by the psychological theories and dream 
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studies of Sigmund Freud, and the political ideas of Karl Marx. According to the major 
spokesman of the movement, the poet and critic André Breton, surrealism was a means of 
releasing the unbridled imagination of the subconscious realm, and reuniting it with the 
conscious realm. Breton embraced idiosyncrasy, while rejecting the idea of an underlying 
madness. Indeed, he defined genius in terms of accessibility to the normally untapped 
unconscious realm, which, he believed, could be attained by poets and painters alike. 
From the 1920s onward, the movement spread over many countries around the globe, 
affecting all aspects of their cultural landscape – visual arts, music, film, as well as 
political and social thought. It reached its heyday during World War II, with artists like 
Dalí and Magritte, who created the most widely recognized images of the movement. 
Surrealists admired the artwork of the ‘insane’ for its freedom of expression, as well as 
artworks created by children. Freud’s work on dream analysis and the unconscious was of 
utmost importance to the Surrealists in developing methods to liberate the imagination. 
They drew heavily on the psychoanalytic practice of ‘free association’ to tap into the 
private world of the mind – traditionally restricted by reason and social 
customs/structures – and allow the workings of the unconscious uninhibited mind (the 
wellspring of the imagination and creative ideas) to reveal itself. The images that sprung 
into existence through their methods were akin to automatism in poetry, surprising and 
unexpected, strange and grotesque, twisted and confusing, as startling as the fantastic, 
irrational, and whimsical images of a dream. 
 
An important function of art is to provide a new interpretation of our surrounding world, 
to uncover its hidden truths. The critical underlying philosophy of surrealism was that by 
rearranging familiar objects – moving them from their familiar/unique contexts into 
unfamiliar/alien contexts; typically ones that form a contrast with their original home – 
we may come to see them in a new light, with an altered meaning and significance. The 
contrast in question might involve a shift from darkness to light, old to new, noise to 
silence, past to present, etc. For example, a surrealist work might involve moving a 
monastery from a craggy hill to the edge of the sea, or into a lively city, or some element 
of the lively city (say, the street with its pedestrians) onto a deserted island, etc. In this 
way the artist draws our attention to an object – one we might have overlooked had it 
been in its familiar setting – and thereby sharpens our focus on it. This technique helps 
bring out ‘hidden’ aspects of the world – ‘hidden’ because they are so familiar that we 
overlook them; we take them for granted. They become insignificant from their 
familiarity.  By rearranging phenomena, the artist makes the insignificant significant. An 
example to illustrate.2 
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Surrealists believed that one could combine, inside the same ‘frame’, elements not norm-
ally found together to produce illogical and startling effects.   
 
Wittgenstein’s method of constructing hypothetical language-games can be viewed as 
employing a similar technique, only in a different medium: language. By taking us on 
journeys into ‘imaginary landscapes’ (imaginary uses of language), where 
words/sentences have a function that differs from their actual function, Wittgenstein 
helps draw our attention to what we have overlooked: their actual function. For it is 
forgetting this, for Wittgenstein, that gives rise to philosophical puzzlement. 
Wittgenstein’s method, as with surrealism, does not involve building a new construction 
out of new material, but only ‘rearranging what we have always known’ [PI §109], like 
the ‘rearrangement of books in a library’. [BB p. 44]3 
 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:1                                                                                                     Gitsoulis | 78 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Unlike many surrealist works, however, Wittgenstein’s re-arrangements of language are 
not arbitrary, spontaneous, chaotic, or a product of ‘free association’, but strategically 
chosen, as we find in the surrealist collages of Odysseus Elytis (above), whose poetry and 
paintings/collages contain extraordinary juxtapositions of ordinary objects, that breathe 
new life into them. In the beginning of the 20th century, Surrealist artists made extensive 
use of collage (the term derives from the French ‘colle’ meaning ‘glue’).  In Elytis’ 
collages, we find ‘method in the madness’. Familiar objects are not re-arranged in a 
purely arbitrary manner, involving a free play of the imagination, but instead are 
strategically positioned in unusual contexts, that give them a new meaning. The strange 
worlds that he creates form a kind of ritual in their capacity to liberate the mind and heart. 
Witness how, e.g., in the image above (right), the rearrangement of an object as simple 
and ordinary as a mussel shell can turn it into something extraordinary – the wings of 
angel! Or how marble statues (in the neighboring collages), through a simple 
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rearrangement, suddenly come to life; they almost seem to be communicating with 
human beings. ‘Sail well’, we hear the maiden cry out to a loved one, ‘and don’t forget 
your poor girl!’  Not only does Elytis succeed in drawing our attention to familiar objects, 
but helps us see them in a light that casts new meaning and value on them. The world, we 
discover, is a magical place indeed when arrangements of familiar objects are open to the 
imagination!  
 
Wittgenstein’s hypothetical language games also involve rearrangements of familiar 
elements of our world. For Wittgenstein, pseudo-philosophical problems are generated by 
overstretching the ‘limits of language’: interpreting the sense and function of 
words/sentences in one use-context/‘language-game’ in terms of their sense/function in 
another use-context/‘language-game’. It is in this respect that we overstretch the ‘limits 
of language’, and generate false interpretations of language that lead to pseudo-
philosophical problems.4 In a hypothetical language-game we are invited to imagine a 
world where the false interpretation is correct. What else would have to be true if it is 
correct? A hypothetical language-game fills in the details. Hence, although an alien 
context is created in a language-game, it is not one that is created in an arbitrary or 
chaotic fashion. The idea is that by accumulating enough of these details, we might at last 
come to see that we are in the grip of a false interpretation. This is why hypothetical 
language-games function like reductio arguments. It is also why this aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s method is more subtle than that of describing actual uses of language: it is 
an indirect method of ‘proof’ – of getting us to recognize our false interpretations.   
 
An example to illustrate. In the note to PI §151, Wittgenstein tries to clarify the grammar 
of our concept of understanding. Can it be correct to think of understanding as a ‘mental 
state’? Well, suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is correct. What else would have to 
be true? To answer this, we need to consider how we actually employ the concept of a 
‘mental state’. We apply it to experiences such as depression, excitement, and pain, 
among others. And what is true about how we apply these terms? We say, e.g., as 
Wittgenstein notes: 
 
Actual use-contexts 
‘He was depressed the whole day.’ 
‘He was in great excitement the whole day.’ 
‘He has been in continuous pain since yesterday.’ 
‘When did your pains get less?’ 
 
But can the notion of ‘understanding’ be used in these ways? To answer this, we need to 
construct imaginary use-contexts where it is used in these ways. Again, using 
Wittgenstein’s examples:   
 
Imaginary use-contexts 
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‘Since yesterday, I have understood this word.’ ‘Continuously’ though?   
‘When did you stop understanding the word?’ 
 
As we can see, it is ‘ungrammatical’ to apply temporal concepts to ‘understanding’ in the 
way we do to mental states: we speak of being in continuous pain, or of a pain being 
interrupted for several minutes, or of suddenly ceasing to feel pain, but it is 
grammatically jarring to regard understanding as ‘clockable’5 in this way. Moreover, it is 
grammatically jarring to apply concepts of intensity to understanding in the way we do to 
mental states: we describe a pain as intense, or an emotion as strong, but it is 
‘ungrammatical’ to describe understanding in these terms.6 One might, but then he would 
be using the term in a nonstandard or conventionally unacceptable way, just as one would 
be using a kitchen table in a conventionally unacceptable way were he to use it as a TV 
stand. To bring this out to someone who decides to use it in this way, you might try 
placing kitchen chairs around the table, and a napkin holder next to the TV (you would be 
creating an imaginary language-game!). If this provokes laughter, you have made your 
point, though indirectly of course. It is similar with words. Laughter might be the 
appropriate response to someone who uses words in the manner of the imaginary use-
context above (‘I stopped understanding the word’, ‘My understanding was continuous 
since yesterday’, etc.). Laughter is a sign that an interpretation is out of place, as in the 
joke:    
 
Patient: I broke my arm in two places. 
Doctor: Don’t go to those places.7 
 
This is why Wittgenstein makes use of jokes to illuminate concepts.  They are supposed 
to help us recognize that we are in the grip of a false interpretation. 
 
Wittgenstein’s obsessive attention to seemingly irrelevant features of how language 
functions makes his works stand apart not only methodologically but also stylistically 
from other philosophical works. A striking aspect of his style of writing is the feeling of 
eeriness or spookiness it is bound to arouse in anyone who first encounters it. (I myself 
have a vivid recollection of this feeling upon first browsing through Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics). The analogy with surrealism can also be used to explain 
this effect of his writing on the reader. Many of us have experienced an eerie, spooky 
feeling, while staring at surrealist art-works, a bit like the feeling we have as tourists 
traveling to unfamiliar lands (witness, e.g., the feeling created by the long shadows, 
strange figures, deep receding spaces, mysterious lighting, and ominous settings of de 
Chirico paintings). These feelings are stirred up by the rearrangement of familiar facts.  
We are spooked by the lack of fit, the paradoxical nature, of the world we behold, which 
is at once familiar and alien. Wittgenstein’s writing generates a similar feeling in the 
reader, and can be traced to the same root. Witness, for example, the following language-
games. 
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Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him 
a slip marked ‘five red apples’. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the 
drawer marked ‘apples’; then he looks up the word ‘red’ in a table and finds a 
color sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers – I assume 
that he knows them by heart – up to the word ‘five’ and for each number he takes 
an apple of the same color as the sample our of the drawer. – It is in this and 
similar ways that one operates with words. … [PI §1] 
 
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. 
The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an 
assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and 
beams.  B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For 
this purpose they use a language consisting of the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, 
‘beam’. A calls them out; – B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such 
and such a call. – Conceive this as a complete primitive language. [PI §2] 
 
The eerie feeling that these language-games generate in the reader stems from using 
familiar words/sentences in unfamiliar ways, just as in surrealism it arises from 
rearranging elements of familiar visual landscapes. The shopping expedition would not, 
in real life, be conducted in the manner portrayed in PI §1. No grocer keeps apples in 
drawers labeled ‘apples’ or consults color charts. We do not live in such ludicrous, 
mechanical worlds. The point is that we are supposed to contrast that imaginary 
language-game with our actual linguistic practices. This might help us see (the contrast 
might help bring to light) that communication does not demand that every word have 
something for which it stands – that something being its meaning – as the Augustinian 
picture (a pseudo-picture) assumes. This is the psychological truth that the language 
games seek to expose. 
 
Through a ‘juxtaposition of two more or less distant realities’, Surrealists, in the words of 
the poet Pierre Reverdy, sought to produce an ‘[image with greater] emotional power and 
poetic reality.’ They believed that there was an element of truth that is revealed by our 
subconscious minds which supercedes the reality of our everyday consciousness. The 
term ‘surreal’, which was used to describe their artistic landscape, literally means ‘above 
reality’. Wittgenstein’s language-games also contain a message or moral (witness the 
games above), a secret truth which the reader must uncover for himself.  For we hardly 
ever find Wittgenstein drawing out morals for us; conventional methods of guiding the 
reader are aborted. There are reasons for this. One is that Wittgenstein sought to 
transform the reader, to force him into a kind of conversion which involved unlearning 
certain bad habits, so as to demystify pseudo-philosophical problems. This is why he says: 
‘Working in philosophy … is really more a working on oneself. On one’s own 
interpretation. On one’s own way of seeing things.’ [CV p. 16] And why, in the Preface 
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to the Philosophical Investigations, he says ‘I should not like my writing to spare other 
people the trouble of thinking, but to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own’. 
Wittgenstein demanded active participation from his reader: the reader must work certain 
things out for himself, he felt, if his work is to have a therapeutic effect on him.   
 
Another reason stems from the fact that Wittgenstein felt that drawing out morals for the 
reader was not necessary for achieving his desired effect: demystification through the 
deconstruction of pseudo-problems. Wittgenstein allows the truth of what makes his 
philosophical method effective to speak for itself. Just as a work of literature (a novel) 
can produce moral effects not by preaching, but simply by being, so too, Wittgenstein 
felt, that he could achieve his aim – disintegration of pseudo-problems – by presenting a 
rich battery of examples, vividly described, of language-in-action, without having to 
explicitly draw any morals for us.  
 
If only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the 
unutterable will be – unutterably – contained in what has been uttered.8 
 
The moral potency of literature attests to this. In order for a work of literature to have 
moral effects, it is not necessary that it present a theory of morality.9 Nor is it necessary 
that it portray morally idealized subjects following rigid rules. Indeed, its moral potency 
is likely to be greater when it portrays morally mixed characters, much like the average 
viewer (as you find in ancient tragedies), and vividly described crises and struggles 
through which they pass, leaving us to draw the moral for ourselves. As Aristotle 
masterfully recognized in the Poetics, the idealized subject, free of common faults, loses 
his/her ability to engage our attention, and in turn our sympathy; the one who is like us, 
who we can relate to emotionally, and hence sympathize with, is the best agent for 
imparting a moral message. In like manner, I imagine Wittgenstein too recognized that 
the roughness and inexactness of commonplace speech, with all its imperfections, set 
before us in numerous actual and imaginary language games, and not a neat philosophical 
theory, still more one couched in an idealized language, could serve as the best agent for 
producing the therapeutic (and arguably moral) effects that he sought to achieve in the 
reader. And, for those effects to be produced, he felt, no morals needed to be explicitly 
drawn.  This contributes to the oracular, poetic quality of his work. 
 
What we have overlooked, what we have forgotten, for Wittgenstein, is often what is 
right before us: how language actually functions. It is to this world (for Wittgenstein both 
the source of and final court of appeal for philosophical disputes) that Wittgenstein was 
constantly drawing our attention (either directly or indirectly), by making the 
insignificant significant, the ordinary extraordinary. It is perhaps in this respect more 
than any other – in recognizing the elementary sources of confusion that lie at the root of 
many of our seemingly most ‘profound’ philosophical problems – that his work was 
revolutionary; and therein, I believe, lays his most valuable contribution to philosophy. 
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6 Wittgenstein’s so-called ‘private language argument’ can also be seen as taking the form of a reduction, as 
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7 This joke is from Richard Gilmore [1999, p. 96]. 
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